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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) received immediate, widespread, and sustained scholarly atten-
tion. Observers debated everything from the decision’s doctrinal substance2 to its
* Professor of Law, Fowler School of Law, Chapman University; B.A. 1988, Boston Uni-
versity; J.D. 1991, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessors Tom Caso, Scott Howe, and Donald Kochan for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 51, 53–61
(Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) [hereinafter Fried,
The June Surprises] (criticizing the commerce, necessary and proper, tax, and spending hold-
ings); Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,” “Proper,” and Health Care Reform, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 105, 105–16 (Nathaniel
Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) [hereinafter Koppelman, Neces-
sary, Proper] (criticizing the necessary and proper analysis contained in the opinions of the
Chief Justice and the joint dissent); Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Judicial Review:
Lessons from the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1821 (2012) (arguing in favor
of judicial enforcement of federalism limits but not “endors[ing] the action-inaction distinc-
tion advanced by five Justices in the ACA decision”); Maureen Mullen Dove, The Obamacare
Decision: Does Anyone Know What It Means?, 46 MD. B.J. 28 (2013) (discussing how to
interpret NFIB and the precedential effect of commerce and necessary and proper rulings);
Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 266 (2012) (examining
why “[l]itigation over the individual mandate focused on the limits of congressional power
embodied within Article I,” rather than on the limits imposed by substantive due process);
Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal Commerce
Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 12 (2012) (discussing how the NFIB decision impacts Com-
merce Clause doctrine); Jerry L. Mashaw, Legal, Imagined, and Real Worlds: Reflections on
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 255
(2013) (evaluating the Chief Justice’s opinion); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, The
Likely Impact of National Federation on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
975, 979 (2013) (evaluating the impact of Commerce Clause decision and concluding that
“[o]n balance . . . history and pragmatism suggest that this case will have a marginal jurispru-
dential impact”); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius: Five Takes, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807, 807 (2013) (discussing five
different “meanings and implications of the Supreme Court’s decision”); Ilya Shapiro, Like
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precedential impact3 and the reasons behind Chief Justice Roberts’s vote to uphold the
so-called “individual mandate”4 under the taxing power,5 despite his simultaneous
conclusion that the mandate exceeded Congress’s commerce power.6 Although the
Eastwood Talking to a Chair: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the Obamacare Ruling,
17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2012) (praising the commerce, necessary and proper, and spending
holdings, and criticizing the tax holding); Andrew Koppelman, Terrible Arguments Prevail!,
SALON (June 28, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/06/28/terrible_arguments_prevail/
[http://perma.cc/B2X4-L2WP] [hereinafter Koppelman, Terrible Arguments] (evaluating the
Chief Justice’s opinion).
Courts are also grappling with how to interpret NFIB. See United States v. Roszkowski,
700 F.3d 50, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2012) (declining an invitation to read NFIB as cutting back on
commerce power in general); United States v. Lott, 912 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152–53 (D. Vt. 2012)
(holding the Chief Justice’s opinion represents the narrowest views of those supporting the
judgment, discussing varying interpretations of NFIB’s commerce and necessary and proper
analyses, and noting that it might well confine the holding in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39
(2005)); United States v. Spann, No. 3:12-CR-126-L, 2012 WL 4341799, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 24, 2012) (addressing whether to combine the Chief Justice’s opinion with that of the
four dissenters and declining to do so).
3 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (And Why
Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (2013) [hereinafter
Barnett, No Small Feat] (explaining why the Chief Justice’s commerce and necessary and
proper discussions represent “the holding[s] of the Court”); Dove, supra note 2, at 31
(discussing how to interpret NFIB and precedential effect of commerce and necessary and
proper analyses); Mashaw, supra note 2, at 264 (arguing that the commerce and necessary
and proper discussions are “pure dictum”); Ilya Somin, The Individual Mandate and the
Proper Meaning of “Proper,” in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 146, 160 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison
eds., 2013) [hereinafter Somin, The Individual Mandate] (discussing whether the commerce and
necessary and proper discussions are dicta); Joel Alicea, The Two Versions of the Avoidance
Canon, SCOTUSREPORT (July 5, 2012, 9:52 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/2013043
092707/http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/05/the-two-versions-of-the-avoidance-canon/
(discussing whether the Chief Justice’s commerce and necessary and proper holdings are dicta).
4 The individual mandate “requires individuals to purchase a health insurance policy
providing a minimum level of coverage.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577. Indi-
viduals who failed to obtain health insurance had to “make an additional payment to the IRS”
at tax time. Id. at 2593–94.
5 But see Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 3, at 1337 (arguing that the Chief Justice did
not uphold the individual mandate under the taxing power, but rather “rewr[ote] the law[ ] . . .
so that it was no longer a mandate but merely an option: get insurance or pay a mild ‘tax’
penalty”).
6 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 171 (Nathaniel
Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (rejecting the suggestion that
Chief Justice Roberts was driven by “political motives, or worse,” and arguing that “[t]he key
elements of his opinion are of a piece with his prior opinions as a justice and circuit court
judge and his accounts of the proper judicial role”); Fried, The June Surprises, supra note 2, at
62–65 (discussing the motivation for the tax holding); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at
996 (“Roberts’s odd embrace of virtually plenary taxing authority rendered largely nugatory
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commerce and taxing power holdings seemed to generate much of the discussion,
the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis captured all of my interest,7 for the Court’s
departure from existing precedent has the potential to severely limit the reach of federal
power.8 As Professors Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. and Grant S. Nelson noted, the Court’s
“newly muscular approach to judicial review suddenly makes many federal laws vul-
nerable to attack.”9 This Article seeks to predict the degree of such vulnerability and,
thus, NFIB’s impact on the future scope of the necessary and proper power.
Despite a long line of cases confirming the breadth and flexibility of the power,10
the NFIB Court ruled that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not support the
the restrictions that he and the four conservatives had placed on the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.” (citation omitted)); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 18–22 (discussing Chief
Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the mandate); Andrew Koppelman, Roberts’ Crafty
Victory: Conservatives Complaining About John Roberts Don’t Understand the Win He
Handed Them, SALON (July 5, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/05/roberts
_crafty_victory [http://perma.cc/5KVH-NBU8] [hereinafter Koppelman, Roberts’ Crafty
Victory] (same).
7 I was not alone in my interest. Professor Gary Lawson views the necessary and proper
analysis as “the most noteworthy discussion” in the decision because both the Chief Justice’s
opinion and that of the joint dissent “advance important propositions about the Necessary and
Proper Clause.” Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and
the Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1701–07 (2013) (citation omitted); see
also Fried, The June Surprises, supra note 2, at 55 (describing the Chief Justice’s necessary
and proper discussion as “[p]articularly eye-catching”); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at
994–95 (noting the importance of Chief Justice Roberts’s necessary and proper analysis);
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 5 (“The Court’s ruling was even more striking with regard to the
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”); Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, passim
(discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis and its implications).
8 See Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 994 (“National Federation was unprecedented
insofar as a majority of Justices claimed that they could substitute their prudential judgments for
Congress’s about the propriety of a statute based on their contestable notions of federalism.”
(citation omitted)); see also infra notes 16–28 and accompanying text.
9 Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 994–95.
10 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (acknowledging that “the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation”
and citing numerous cases supporting that point); id. at 133–37 (describing broad scope of
power); id. at 149 (“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause is part of ‘a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.’” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819))); see also
Greene, supra note 2, at 276 (“At the start of the litigation, there was no case holding, even
remotely, that either the constitutional structure or the Tenth Amendment itself prevents the
federal government from conscripting individuals into acting against their will to accomplish
some federal regulatory objective.” (citation omitted)). But see Ilya Somin, Comstock, Bond
and Predictions About the Individual Mandate Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 22, 2013,
11:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/02/22/comstock-bond-and-predictions-about-the
-individual-mandate-case/ [http://perma.cc/7CHL-DQ24] [hereinafter Somin, Comstock,
Bond] (“Comstock . . . should have alerted observers to the likelihood that the individual
mandate litigation would not be an easy win for the federal government.”).
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individual mandate.11 According to Chief Justice Roberts, who delivered the judg-
ment of the Court,12 the individual mandate was not “an essential component of the
[Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)] insurance reforms,” because
it was not a “derivative of, and in service to,” an enumerated power.13 And even if he
could be persuaded that it was “‘necessary’ to the Act’s insurance reforms,”14 it was
not “proper” because it was neither “narrow in scope” nor “‘incidental’ to the exercise
of the commerce power,” and, thus, would dramatically expand federal power at the
expense of the states.15 In the end, the individual mandate failed under the Necessary
and Proper Clause for the precise reason it failed under the commerce power—it
simply went too far.
NFIB introduced new and stringent limits on the necessary and proper power.16
It applied the “necessary” prong in a rigid manner, requiring a tight fit between the
means and the enumerated power.17 But such rigidity is inconsistent with the general
understanding—since McCulloch v. Maryland18—that necessity is a broad, flexible
concept19 left largely up to Congress.20 “Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall’s
11 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–93 (2012); id. at 2644–48 (joint dissent).
12 Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion announcing the judgment, but none of the other
four Justices who agreed with the necessary and proper result joined his opinion. Id. at 2577.
Instead, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito wrote a joint dissent on necessary and
proper (and other) grounds. Id. at 2642.
13 Id. at 2592.
14 Id.
15 Id. (citation omitted).
16 See Koppelman, Terrible Arguments, supra note 2 (“The [C]ourt . . . for the first time[ ]
imposed limits on Congress’s broad powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”).
17 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (joint dissent) (rejecting the mandate be-
cause “there are many ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate by which the
regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance premiums and ensuring the profitability of
insurers could be achieved”); see, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 2, at 830 (noting
that the Court’s analysis “is a far cry from prior decisions whose scrutiny of congressional
claims of necessity was less than rigorous” (citation omitted)). Robert N. Weiner correctly
notes that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion “reiterated Congress’s broad discretion in choosing
how to effectuate its enumerated powers.” Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Im-
pact of the Supreme Court Decision Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 69, 74 (Nathaniel
Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) [hereinafter Weiner, Much Ado]
(citation omitted). The problem, however, is that the opinion fails to give deference to that
“broad discretion.” Instead, it simply asserts without analysis that the means are not suffi-
ciently related to the ends. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
18 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
19 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010) (“[T]he Necessary and Proper
Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the
authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 418)).
20 Id. at 135 (“If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the
end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness
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famous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, which construed the Sweeping Clause
to require only a minimal ‘fit’ between legislatively chosen means and a valid gov-
ernmental end, the clause has not been widely viewed as a significant substantive limi-
tation on congressional authority.”21
More striking, however, is NFIB’s invalidation of the mandate under the “proper”
prong—a prong that has not been a primary focus in the Court’s Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence.22 The Chief Justice’s characterization of the mandate
as “work[ing] a substantial expansion of federal authority”23 echoes the now familiar
warning from United States v. Lopez24 that Congress lacks “a general police power of
of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for
congressional determination alone.” (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534,
547–48 (1934))). But see Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 207–08 (2003) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall
articulated and intended a tighter means/ends test in McCulloch).
21 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Juris-
dictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 271 (1993) (citations
omitted); see Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 109 (“McCulloch has since
been read to say that Congress has a broad choice of means.”); cf. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]n this Court’s understanding of con-
gressional power under [the Commerce and Necessary and Proper] Clauses, many of Congress’
other enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous.”).
22 See Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 146 (“[I]n the first 220 years of
its history, the Supreme Court never gave us anything approaching a comprehensive analysis
of what it means for a law to be ‘proper.’”); id. at 149–50 (“[T]he Court has been far less clear
on the meaning of ‘proper.’”); see also Lawson, supra note 7, at 1703 (“Until NFIB, the only
instances in which the Court expressly applied this understanding of [‘proper’] involved direct
regulation of states or state officials.”); Lawson & Granger, supra note 21, at 291 (noting that
“ever since the Court’s decision in McCulloch,” the term “proper” has related to “[f]it,” just
like the “now-accepted construction of ‘necessary’” (citation omitted)); Mashaw, supra note
2, at 264 (arguing that the Chief Justice’s opinion “now invite[s] [lower courts] . . . to take
an approach to the necessary and proper clause that has never been law at all”); Shapiro,
supra note 2, at 6 (“This is the first modern acceptance of the idea that even if something
might be necessary it might not be proper.” (citation omitted)); id. (“[W]hile the challengers
and especially certain amici had been arguing that the ‘proper’ part of the Necessary and Proper
Clause had to be considered separately, no court had ever held that.”); cf. Mashaw, supra
note 2, at 262 (Chief Justice Roberts “imagines that proper in the necessary and proper clause
encompasses some test other than the constitutional propriety of the congressional action. For
nearly two hundred years, proper in the necessary and proper clause has meant only that the
congressional action must not violate some other constitutional prohibition.” (citation omitted)).
Although Professor Somin acknowledges that the Court has not provided a clear meaning
of “proper,” he argues that the treatment of necessary and proper as two distinct concepts began
in McCulloch. Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 149–51. But see Mark A.
Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 1854
(2011) (asserting that necessary and proper are “a single construct”).
23 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
24 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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the sort retained by the States,”25 and to that extent it plows no new ground. The new
ground comes from the rejection of the mandate because it would allow “Congress [to]
reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope
those who otherwise would be outside of it.”26 In other words, because Congress
could not reach inactivity (“the failure to purchase [health] insurance”)27 under the
commerce power, it could not do so under the necessary and proper power.28 To be
sure, the Court recently warned that federalism limits the reach of the necessary and
proper power.29 But it has not, until NFIB, gone as far as saying that Congress may
not regulate indirectly through the necessary and proper power that which it may not
regulate directly through an enumerated power. Professor Andrew Koppelman is
correct; this sort of reasoning “reads the Necessary and Proper Clause out of the
Constitution completely.”30
After NFIB, many observers doubtless found themselves asking the same questions
they were asking in 1995 when the Supreme Court drew a line in the sand in Lopez
after sixty years of imposing virtually no limits on the federal commerce power31: Was
the Court really serious about imposing vigorous federalism limits on one of Congress’s
25 Id. at 567.
26 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
27 Id. at 2585.
28 See infra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Bruce F. Howell & Michael A.
Clark, “If It Quacks Like a Duck...” An Analysis of the United States Supreme Court
Decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 24 HEALTH L. 18, 21
(2012) (recognizing that “a majority of the justices concluded that because the individual
mandate cannot be authorized under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper clause
was powerless to justify it”).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty
are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause;
if so, that is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal
power.” (emphasis added)); id. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Necessary and Proper
Clause does not give Congress carte blanche. Although the term ‘necessary’ does not mean
‘absolutely necessary’ or indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a
power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.” (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819))); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining federalism limits on the Necessary and Proper Clause);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into
Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the
various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
30 Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 8 (2011) [hereinafter Koppelman, Bad News
for Mail Robbers] (addressing the reasoning in lower court decisions concerning the con-
stitutionality of the individual mandate).
31 See, e.g., Symposium, The New Federalism after United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 635 (1996) (discussing the possible impact and meaning of Lopez).
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biggest powers?32 What is the impact on the doctrine, the scope of federal power, and
the role of the judiciary?33 As a broad power, the Necessary and Proper Clause would
be a natural target for those Justices interested in curbing federal authority, but was the
Court really serious about reining in the Necessary and Proper Clause that much?
Professors Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning argue that the Chief
Justice’s opinion in NFIB might actually make advances in vindicating federalism
even though it upheld the ACA.34 They posit that the Chief Justice remains commit-
ted to federalism and argue that his NFIB decision could be viewed as “a shrewd
opening gambit by someone playing a long game.”35 On the other hand, while recog-
nizing the potential for a serious cutback in federal power,36 Professors Pushaw and
Nelson predict that NFIB ultimately will have little impact on federal authority,
because either a change in personnel on the Court would create an opportunity to cut
back on the ruling, the Court lacked the fortitude to reconsider and overrule decades
of precedent, or the Court was unable to hang onto the federalism gains initiated by
its decisions in Lopez and United States v. Morrison.37 They predict that “the Court
will likely revert to its traditional practice of deferring to such congressional judgments
because they tend to be subjective and policy-laden.”38
This Article agrees that the Chief Justice remains committed to judicial enforce-
ment of federalism limits, but does not go so far as to suggest that his opinion sets
the stage for dramatic long-term change in necessary and proper doctrine. Indeed,
although the Article disagrees that the Court will resume a deferential posture toward
congressional policy choices across the board, it predicts that in many cases NFIB
will have almost no discernable impact on necessary and proper doctrine, even if the
32 Chief Justice Roberts opened his NFIB opinion in much the same way as did Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Lopez—emphasizing that “[t]he Federal Government is . . . ‘one of
enumerated powers,’” and that this “enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577. One might reasonably view this as a reliable
indicator of the Chief Justice’s seriousness. But as explained in Part II, his seriousness relates
to the general need for judicial enforcement of federalism limits, not an ultra-narrow in-
terpretation of the necessary and proper power. See infra Part II.
33 See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2 (characterizing the NFIB litigation as “a case that comes
along once every generation,” because it involves the great and important issues of federalism,
“the role of the judiciary in saying what the law is and checking the political branches and the
scope of and limits to all three branches’ powers”).
34 Reynolds & Denning, supra note 2, at 831 (“Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion (and that
of the joint dissenters) suggests that judicially enforced federalism has some life yet.”).
35 Id. at 828; see id. at 830 (describing the Chief Justice’s necessary and proper analysis
as “a far cry from prior decisions whose scrutiny of congressional claims of necessity was
less than rigorous”(citation omitted)).
36 Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 994–95 (“Because the ‘substantial effects’ test rests
heavily upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, this newly muscular approach to judicial re-
view suddenly makes many federal laws vulnerable to attack.” (citation omitted)).
37 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 995–96.
38 Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 996 (citation omitted).
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Court remains committed to judicial enforcement of federalism, and even in the ab-
sence of personnel change on the Court.39 But it also predicts that, in some cases,
particularly those involving a combination of the commerce and necessary and proper
powers, NFIB could have a noticeable impact (assuming the Court retains a federal-
ism majority). This is because the Court’s necessary and proper holding was not really
about imposing drastic restrictions on the necessary and proper power; it was about
reinvigorating limits on Congress’s commerce power—the enormous federal power
that has long been the on-again, off-again focus of the Court’s federalism attention.40
In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause was not the target of the Court’s
federalism ire in NFIB, but rather was the victim of the Court’s current federalism
campaign to rein in the federal commerce power.41
Relying on the Court’s treatment of the Necessary and Proper Clause since Lopez,
Part I shows that the Court did not have the Necessary and Proper Clause in its cross-
hairs before NFIB, lending credence to the theory that it could not have been serious
about imposing the limits applied in NFIB to all future exercises of the necessary
and proper power. Part II begins with a close look primarily at Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion, arguing that it reveals not so much a preoccupation with the necessary and
proper power as with the commerce power and, as a result, with the combination of
the two powers. The passage of time supports this assessment, for as Part II explains,
in the three years since NFIB was handed down the Court declined two significant
opportunities to restrict Congress’s exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
neither of which involved the commerce power.42
39 Professor Lawson argues that the “doctrinal consequences [of the decision] are difficult
to gauge” and warns that “future predictions of doctrinal development are treacherous at best.”
Lawson, supra note 7, at 1700. With respect to the necessary and proper and commerce
holdings, he suggests that they “may or may not survive the next vacancy on the Supreme
Court . . . .” Id. Several other scholars make a similar observation. See, e.g., Barnett, No Small
Feat, supra note 3, at 1341 (“Of course a change in the Justices could negate the importance
of the NFIB decision, but that could happen with any doctrine.”); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note
2, at 993–94 (noting that “the durability of National Federation’s Commerce Clause holding,
as well as the Lopez/Morrison stricture against regulating ‘noncommercial’ activity, depends
on whether the five Republican Justices continue serving (or are replaced by like-minded
jurists)” (citation omitted)); Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 161 (“Ultimately,
much will depend on who gets appointed to the Supreme Court in the next few years.”). All
are correct. This Article attempts to discern what the current Court meant with respect to the
necessary and proper power and, accordingly, how it (or a similarly constituted Court) might
treat it in the future. Loss of a federalism majority could impact some of its predictions. See
infra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
40 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552–60 (describing the history of the Court’s treatment of the
commerce power).
41 Cf. Jackson, supra note 2, at 12 (describing NFIB’s commerce holding as “another in
a series of cases reversing a consensus held among members of the Supreme Court for two
generations on the breadth of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause”).
42 In United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013), seven members of the Court
voted to uphold a broad exercise of the power without a single citation to NFIB. See infra
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Considering NFIB in the light of decisions handed down both before and after it,
Part II concludes that a majority of the Court was serious about two things: (1) con-
tinuing the specific mission it began in Lopez to contain the scope of the federal com-
merce power; and (2) continuing the more general Lopez mission of preventing the use
of any federal power if it results in a general federal police power. Part II predicts that
necessary and proper doctrine likely will undergo some, but not drastic, change. It
should be business as usual in cases where Congress seeks to enforce an enumerated
power other than commerce, which means deference to Congress in choice of means
and the ability to regulate areas that cannot be reached under an enumerated power.
This should be true whether or not the Court keeps its federalism majority. But if the
power is used so aggressively as to transform the Necessary and Proper Clause into
a general police power, then a majority of the current Court will be inclined to invali-
date it as “improper,” no matter what enumerated power Congress is trying to enforce.
Finally, use of the power in combination with the commerce power likely will trigger
closer scrutiny, at least where Congress’s selected means are unusual, as in NFIB,
or involve local non-economic activity, as in Lopez and Morrison.
I. BETWEEN LOPEZ AND NFIB: NO SERIOUS TARGET PRACTICE WITH THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER POWER
The extent to which NFIB will impact necessary and proper doctrine depends on
whether the Court was serious about cutting back the necessary and proper power. The
answer to this question begins not with NFIB, but with the necessary and proper deci-
sions handed down in the seventeen years between Lopez and NFIB.43 With four
notes 158–78 and accompanying text. And in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014),
the Court sidestepped the necessary and proper issue, ruling that the statute did not apply to
the petitioner’s conduct. See infra notes 179–89 and accompanying text.
43 The discussion in Part I does not include Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007),
which contains only a cursory reference to the necessary and proper power at the end of its
opinion. Id. at 22 (rejecting petitioner’s “alternative argument” because “[r]egulation of na-
tional bank operations is a prerogative of Congress under the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses”). Nor does it include United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which,
like Lopez, was framed as a Commerce Clause case. Id. at 607 (“[W]e turn to the question
whether [the law] falls within Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, of the Constitution. [Peti-
tioners] rely upon the third clause of the section, which gives Congress power ‘[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.’”
(fourth alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3)); id. at 608–19 (discussing
the commerce power)); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (“We hold that the Act exceeds the authority
of Congress ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .’” (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)); id. at 552–53 (explaining history and scope of
commerce power). It is true that Justice Scalia, among others, views both Lopez and Morrison
as involving a combination of the necessary and proper and commerce powers. See infra
notes 83–88, 212 and accompanying text. But even if we include Morrison (and Lopez) in
the discussion of necessary and proper cases handed down before NFIB, neither case would
undermine the argument that the Court was uninterested in drastically cutting back on the neces-
sary and proper power. In fact, both cases support this Article’s assertion that enforcement
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cases in that time period specifically addressing the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as the main issue,44 one could reasonably conclude that the Court had some
interest in the Clause. As it turns out, however, during the post-Lopez age of judicially
enforced federalism limits, the Court as a whole displayed no serious interest in a
general scaling back of the power, and the necessary and proper power survived
fairly intact.
To be sure, we see a concern for federalism. The Court confirmed, for example, that
“necessary” and “proper” represent separate limits on federal power, both of which are
designed to enforce federalism.45 And in two cases—Printz v. United States46 and Alden
v. Maine47—the Court rejected the challenged federal laws as improper. As Printz ex-
plained, when a federal law designed to execute an enumerated power “violates the
principle of state sovereignty . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execu-
tion’” the enumerated power.48 Both Printz and Alden involved significant incursions
on state sovereignty—commandeering state executives (Printz)49 and abrogating state
sovereign immunity in state courts (Alden),50 rendering the laws in each case im-
proper under the Clause.51 Thus, both underscore the Court’s view of the “proper”
at the outer boundaries is precisely the type of enforcement to which the Court remains com-
mitted, as the legislation in both cases exceeded the outer boundaries of federal power and
would have transformed federal power into a general police power. See Fried, The June
Surprises, supra note 2, at 52 (“[P]enalizing beating up a girlfriend [(Morrison)] or carrying
a gun near a school [(Lopez)] . . . could not without a very long stretch be characterized as
economic regulation.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Constitutional Showdown, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A25 (“Neither of the laws at issue in [Lopez and Morrison] plausibly
fell within the Constitution’s grant of congressional power to regulate ‘commerce among the
several states’ . . . .”).
44 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) (federal law authorizing civil
commitment of certain federal prisoners beyond date they otherwise would be released proper
exercise of necessary and proper power); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (federal law
criminalizing intrastate use and possession of medical marijuana proper exercise of com-
merce and necessary and proper powers); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (federal
law forbidding bribery of officials of state and local entities that receive at least $10,000 in
federal funding proper exercise of necessary and proper power); Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538
U.S. 456 (2003) (federal statute tolling state statute of limitations proper exercise of Necessary
and Proper Clause).
45 Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462–64 (emphasizing separate requirements of necessary and proper);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732–33 (1999) (separate consideration of proper); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (separate consideration of proper); Somin, The
Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 150 (explaining that Printz and Alden make clear that
the proper prong “imposes a limit on federal power distinct from that of necessity”).
46 521 U.S. 898.
47 527 U.S. 706.
48 Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
49 Id. at 935.
50 Alden, 527 U.S. at 732–33.
51 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part) (“[C]ompell[ing] state officials to act on the Federal
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prong as a federalism enforcement tool.52 But nothing in the very short discussions
in those cases suggests that the Court intended to use this tool to cut back drastically
on the traditional scope of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.53
Meanwhile, in the four cases discussed below, each of which features the neces-
sary and proper power as the main issue (unlike Printz and Alden),54 we see plenty
of evidence suggesting a fairly robust power, including recognition of the important
role the Necessary and Proper Clause plays in assisting Congress in its efforts to
address the myriad of problems facing our nation, as well as a corresponding confir-
mation of the breadth and scope of the power.55 In each case, a majority of the Court
endorsed the flexible nature of “necessary” with analysis that is familiarly loose and
deferential.56 This is true whether the underlying enumerated power is the commerce
Government’s behalf . . . ‘violate[s] state sovereignty and [is] thus not in accord with the
Constitution.’” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)); Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra
note 2, at 111 (explaining that both Printz and Alden “relied on state sovereignty” to support
violations of the “proper” prong).
52 Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 150, 153 (discussing the Court’s use
of “proper” to protect federalism and invalidate federal laws at issue in Printz and Alden);
see also Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 111 (stating that Printz and Alden
“show that ‘proper’ is a limit on Congress’s choice of means”).
53 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (emphasizing the limited nature of Printz’s reading of “proper” and explain-
ing that it prohibited federal laws that invaded state sovereignty by “compell[ing] state offi-
cials to act on the Federal Government’s behalf,” not laws such as the individual mandate that
acted “directly upon individuals, without employing the States as intermediaries” (citations
omitted)); Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 111 (explaining that Printz and Alden
“relied on state sovereignty” to define proper, “which was not at issue in NFIB”). But see
Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 150 (“Nothing in the Court’s analysis [in
Printz] suggests that a law is only improper if it somehow threatens state sovereignty.”).
54 For the discussion on Jinks v. Richland County, see infra notes 57–63; on Sabri v. United
States, see infra notes 64–72; on Gonzales v. Raich, see infra notes 73–96; and on United States
v. Comstock, see infra notes 97–117.
55 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142–43 (2010) (explaining that the
“Federal Government is the custodian of its prisoners” and thus the Necessary and Proper
Clause enables Congress to “confine an individual whose mental illness threatens others”);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (describing the disputed legislation as an effort by
Congress to “consolidate various drug laws on the books into a comprehensive statute, pro-
vide meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal
channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the traffic in illicit drugs”); Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause en-
ables Congress “to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under [the Spending Clause]
are in fact spent for the general welfare”); Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003)
(explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass legislation that will
“carry[  ] into execution [its] power ‘[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court’”
as provided in Article I of the Constitution (third alteration in original)).
56 See Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133 (beginning its legal analysis with the assertion that “the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation”);
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (explaining that “Congress [does not need] to legislate with scientific
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power or some other power. And although the Court (or some of the Justices) ad-
dressed the issue of propriety, in none of these four cases did the Court invalidate
congressional action as improper and nothing suggested that the Court interpreted the
term to prohibit Congress from regulating indirectly that which it could not regulate
directly. NFIB’s necessary and proper ruling, therefore, was not the culmination of an
almost two-decades-long plan to significantly shrink the necessary and proper power.
Decided in 2003, Jinks v. Richland County57 involved an exercise of the neces-
sary and proper power to execute two federal powers—Congress’s power to establish
lower federal courts and the judiciary’s power to decide Article III cases and contro-
versies.58 The federal law at issue tolled state statutes of limitations governing certain
disputes while they were pending in federal court.59 The Court unanimously upheld
the law even though it was not vital to the “exist[ence] and function” of the federal
courts—Congress can establish federal courts and the federal judiciary can exercise
its Article III power without such a law.60 As the Court explained, it “long ago rejected
the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be
‘absolutely necessary’” to the exercise of an enumerated power.”61 In this case, the
law satisfied the necessity requirement because it was “‘conducive to the due admin-
istration of justice’ in federal court” and was “‘plainly adapted’ to that end.”62 Although
the Court recognized outer limits—the means must be proper and cannot be “so at-
tenuated as to undermine the enumeration of powers set forth in Article I, § 8”63—
nothing in the Court’s analysis suggests the impropriety of regulating that which cannot
be regulated under an enumerated power alone, a general tightening up of the means/
ends connection, or a decrease in deference to congressional selection of means.
One year after Jinks, the Court had no difficulty upholding a broad exercise of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, this time in conjunction with the spending power.
In Sabri v. United States,64 the Court upheld a federal law criminalizing bribery in-
volving entities that receive a minimum of $10,000 in federal money, even when the
bribe is unrelated to the federal money.65 Just as Congress has authority under the
Clause to “see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under [the spending] power
exactitude”); Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606 (highlighting that “Congress does not have to sit by and
accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity”); Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462
(explaining that acts of Congress need not be “‘absolutely necessary’ to the exercise of an
enumerated power” (citation omitted)).
57 538 U.S. 456.
58 Id. at 462.
59 Id. at 458.
60 Id. at 462.
61 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
414–15 (1819)).
62 Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417).
63 Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
64 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
65 Id. at 602, 604.
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are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft,” it also has
authority to “protect spending objects from the menace of local administrators on
the take.”66 The Court rejected comparisons to Lopez and Morrison, explaining that
“the effects of [the regulated] activities on interstate commerce [in those cases were]
insufficiently robust.”67 By contrast, the “reliability of those who use public money
is bound up with congressional authority to spend in the first place,” making regulation
of corrupt conduct a useful means of effectuating exercises of the spending power,
even if the corruption is unconnected to public money.68
The majority’s opinion, which cited McCulloch as authorizing “means-ends
rationality” review in necessary and proper cases,69 drew a concurrence from Justice
Thomas, who refused to join the opinion because he thought it endorsed a “question-
able” reach of the necessary and proper power.70 Justice Thomas disagreed that
McCulloch required only rationality review, arguing instead that it required an “ob-
vious” or “clear” link between the means and the enumerated power.71 Using this test,
he “doubt[ed] that” the federal bribery law at issue was “a proper use of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause as applied to Congress’ power to spend.”72 This is exactly
the kind of interpretation of the necessary and proper power one would expect from
a Justice committed to more rigorously limiting the reach of federal power in the name
of federalism. Yet no other Justice joined Justice Thomas in criticizing the rational-
ity test and calling for much closer scrutiny of congressional means.
Not much changed one year later in Gonzales v. Raich,73 where the Court con-
tinued to apply a deferential rationality analysis, allowing Congress to reach purely
local activity as a necessary and proper means of executing Congress’s commerce
power.74 Raich involved application of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)75 to
purely intrastate production, consumption, and possession of medical marijuana.76
The Court upheld such application as a reasonable means of effectuating the CSA,
which was designed to eliminate the interstate market in illegal drugs, a goal “well
66 Id. at 605, 608.
67 Id. at 607. The Court addressed Lopez and Morrison in response to petitioner’s argu-
ment that the legislation at issue in his case was “all of a piece” with that in Lopez and
Morrison. Id. It is unclear whether the Sabri Court considered those two cases as purely com-
merce cases or a combination of necessary and proper and commerce. For an explanation of
whether they ought to be viewed as the latter, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–35
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring), and also infra notes 83–88, 212 and accompanying text.
68 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.
69 Id. at 605.
70 Id. at 611–14 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 612–13.
72 Id. at 613. He declined to decide the issue, though, as he concluded that the federal
bribery law was in line with the Court’s Commerce Clause precedent. Id. at 614.
73 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
74 Id. at 17–19, 22.
75 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
76 Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
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within Congress’ commerce power.”77 The Court recognized Congress’s power to
regulate local activities that, in the aggregate, “pose[ ] a threat to a national market.”78
“Congress [does not need] to legislate with scientific exactitude”79 by compiling a
factual record to support the reach of the law; all that is necessary is that “Congress had
a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.”80 Having “no dif-
ficulty concluding” that Congress had such a rational basis, the Court upheld applica-
tion of the CSA to purely local, otherwise off-limits conduct.81
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, finding that Congress had authority to
reach local production, possession, and consumption of medical marijuana as a means
of facilitating Congress’s efforts under the Commerce Clause “to extinguish the in-
terstate market in . . . controlled substances.”82 He wrote separately, however, to clarify
“the doctrinal foundation” for the decision83 and the relationship between the necessary
and proper power and the commerce power.84 The majority’s analysis centered on
the so-called “category three” of a traditional commerce analysis, which allows
regulation of intrastate activity that either “substantially affect[s] interstate com-
merce”85 or is “necessary to mak[ing] a regulation of interstate commerce effective.”86
But as Justice Scalia explained, the “category three” analysis is actually a necessary
and proper analysis: “[A]ctivities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not
themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot
come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, . . . Congress’s regulatory authority
over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce . . .
derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”87 Thus, the “Necessary and Proper
Clause . . . empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers
77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. at 17.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 22.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 33.
84 Although the majority framed the issue as involving both the necessary and proper and
commerce powers, see id. at 5, 22, the bulk of its discussion referenced the rational basis test
in connection with the commerce power, which might lead one to conclude that Raich is a
Commerce Clause case. See, e.g., id. at 22 (explaining that it “ha[d] no difficulty concluding
that Congress had a rational basis” for regulating the “intrastate manufacture and possession
of marijuana” in accordance with the Commerce Clause). Justice Scalia wrote “separately
because [his] understanding of the doctrinal foundation on which th[e] holding rests is, if not
inconsistent with that of the Court, at least more nuanced.” Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 35.
87 Id. at 34; see Lawson, supra note 7, at 1708 (explaining that evaluation of “noninterstate-
commerce-but-interstate-commerce-affecting activity . . . must center on the Necessary and
Proper Clause, not the Commerce Clause”).
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that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.”88 No clearer expression of the
reach of the necessary and proper power is possible.89
We have federalism dissenters, but nothing that suggests a groundswell of support
for a drastic scaling back on the necessary and proper power. Justice O’Connor dis-
sented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, balking at the idea
that Congress can regulate local activity just because the government says it is related
to “comprehensive regulatory schemes.”90 Such a rule, she argued, “allows Congress
to regulate intrastate activity without check.”91 But Justice O’Connor did not argue that
Congress could never reach local activity. Instead, the federal balance requires demon-
strated need for the regulation of local activity, something she found lacking in
Raich.92 Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent raising a similar concern about lack
of proof, but his dissent went a little further.93 He argued that even if regulation of local
medical marijuana use was necessary to a regulation of interstate commerce, it would
not be proper because it “encroached on States’ traditional police powers . . . .”94 He
assuredly is concerned about enforcing “meaningful limits”95 on the necessary and
proper and commerce powers, and his reliance on “proper” to prevent a “general
‘police power’”96 gets us closer, but not all the way, to the narrow interpretation of
the necessary and proper power articulated by the Chief Justice in NFIB.
In its 2010 decision in United States v. Comstock,97 the Court embraced a breathtak-
ing vision of the Necessary and Proper Clause, confirming not only Congress’s “broad
authority to enact federal legislation,”98 but also its own tradition of deference to
Congress in selecting the means and assessing necessity.99 There, the Court upheld
88 Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg quoted this very language in her NFIB dissent when explaining
the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
90 Raich, 545 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 46.
92 Id. at 52 (“[S]omething more than mere assertion is required when Congress purports
to have power over local activity whose connection to an interstate market is not self-evident.
Otherwise, the Necessary and Proper Clause will always be a back door for unconstitutional
federal regulation.”); id. at 53 (“There is simply no evidence that homegrown medicinal
marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a discernable, let
alone substantial, impact on the national illicit drug market—or otherwise to threaten the
CSA regime.”).
93 Id. at 60–64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress cannot define the scope of its own power
merely by declaring the necessity of its enactments.”).
94 Id. at 66.
95 Id. at 65.
96 Id. (citation omitted).
97 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
98 Id. at 133.
99 Id. at 134–35; see Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers, supra note 30, at 5 (“The
basic rule of McCulloch was reaffirmed by the Court as recently as May 2010 in United States
v. Comstock.” (citation omitted)).
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a federal law authorizing civil commitment of certain federal prisoners beyond their
release date if, because of a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” there
is a serious likelihood they would engage in “sexually violent conduct or child moles-
tation.”100 Even though Congress lacks the direct power to criminalize all sexually
violent conduct and child molestation, it can seek to prevent such conduct as a means
of enforcing Congress’s implied power to regulate for the safety of “prisoners, prison
workers[,] . . . visitors, and those in surrounding communities,”101 which helps en-
sure a safe and effective system of imprisonment, which helps enforce the criminal
laws, which helps enforce an enumerated power.102 In so holding, the Court explicitly
“reject[ed] [the] argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits no more than
a single step between an enumerated power and an Act of Congress.”103 Although
the means selected by Congress must “ultimately . . . ‘derive[ ] from’ an enumerated
power,” there can be several exercises of the necessary and proper power in between
the law at issue and the enumerated power Congress is trying to execute.104 Each exer-
cise of the necessary and proper power facilitates the next, until we reach the end of
the chain: the enumerated power.
The principles applied in Comstock are hardly new, as the Court recognized.105
Still, the Court’s articulation of these principles in Comstock is immensely important
because it endorsed an enormous reach of the necessary and proper power—even
when used with the commerce power (the enumerated power often used to justify crim-
inal laws)106—at a time when the Court was thought to be preoccupied with limiting
federal power. True, Comstock acknowledged federalism limitations, noting a partic-
ular concern with the federal government wielding “a general ‘police power.’”107 And
it took pains to explain why the law did not cross the line, laying out “five consider-
ations” that support its holding, three of which speak directly to federalism interests.108
100 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130.
101 Id. at 137.
102 Id. at 142–43 (stating that the federal law at issue “is ‘reasonably adapted,’ to Congress’
power to act as a responsible federal custodian (a power that rests, in turn, upon federal criminal
statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally enumerated authority).” (citations
omitted)).
103 Id. at 148.
104 Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 146–48 (discussing Sabri v. United States, 514 U.S. 600 (2004); United States
v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1879); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) as
examples).
106 Id. at 147–48 (noting that “Congress relies on different enumerated powers (often, but
not exclusively, its Commerce Clause power) to enact its various federal criminal statutes”).
107 Id. at 148 (citation omitted).
108 Id. at 133, 149. The five considerations are:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of
federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s
enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguard-
ing the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the
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But such federalism rumblings are drowned out by the Court’s actual holding (which
allowed Congress to seek to prevent conduct that it could not reach under an enumer-
ated power),109 as well as its recognition of “the breadth of the Necessary and Proper
Clause,”110 and its parting reminder that the Constitution was drafted to accommodate
change, even if that meant an “expansion of the Federal Government’s role.”111
Justices Kennedy and Alito each concurred in the judgment, warning that the
Necessary and Proper Clause is not limitless and that it demands a more rigorous as-
sessment of necessity.112 Notably, however, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority
without writing separately to share the same warning. Professor Ilya Somin suggests
that “the inclusion of the five factor test in the opinion may have been the price that
Chief Justice John Roberts forced the four liberal justices to pay for casting the decisive
fifth vote in favor of the majority opinion.”113 But even if Professor Somin is correct
that Chief Justice Roberts insisted on the five factors, the fact is he remained silent in
the face of very broad language about the power—language that prompted two of his
colleagues to write concurrences and join only the judgment. And even with the five
factors, the bottom line is that the Court upheld the civil commitment of any federal
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow
scope.
Id. at 149. Factors (2), (4), and (5) reveal federalism concerns.
109 Id. at 130, 147–48 (“[E]very such statute must itself be legitimately predicated on an
enumerated power. And the same enumerated power that justifies the creation of a federal
criminal statute, and that justifies . . . additional implied federal powers . . . justifies civil
commitment under [the statutory provision] as well.”)
110 Id. at 149.
111 Id. As the Court explained:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would, have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first because the Framers
would not have conceived that any government would conduct such
activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed
that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such
responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government
by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for
the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.
Id. at 148–49 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
112 Justice Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize two things: (1) the need for a more
rigorous rational basis test, such as that used in the commerce power cases; and (2) an inva-
sion of “essential attributes of state sovereignty” by an exercise of the Necessary and Proper
Clause could be considered an improper exercise of the power. Id. at 150–53 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito wrote separately to express “concern[ ] about the breadth of the
Court’s language and the ambiguity of the standard that the Court applies.” Id. at 155 (Alito,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). He reiterated that the “[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause
does not give Congress carte blanche,” and that “the term ‘necessary’ . . . requires an ‘appro-
priate’ link between a power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.”
Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
113 Somin, Comstock, Bond, supra note 10.
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prisoner beyond his release date if the involved state(s) will not “assume responsibility
for his custody, care, and treatment” and the prisoner “(1) has previously ‘engaged
or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation,’ (2) currently
‘suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,’ and (3) ‘as a result of’
that mental illness, abnormality or disorder is ‘sexually dangerous to others’” (e.g.,
likely to commit a state or federal sexual crime).114 It is difficult to characterize this
as a limited holding.115
The strongest objection came from Justice Thomas, who mainly argued that the
law served no legitimate enumerated end and that there can be no more than one step
in between the exercise of an implied power and the enumerated power it supports.116
Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas on the first point but not the second.117 So at the
end of the day we have four Justices seeking to apply a more rigorous analysis, though
only two saw fit to dissent. Although the decision might remind us that the Court
will enforce the outer boundaries on federal power, and that some Justices wish to
tighten up the analysis even more, it does not foretell a drastic cutback on the power.
Altogether, the post-Lopez decisions confirm the breadth of the power, while at
the same time warning that the Court will police the outer federalism boundary to
prevent creation of a federal police power and incursions onto state sovereignty.
Although the federalism discussion gets a little louder as we move closer in time to
NFIB, it is not so loud as to suggest a major shift in doctrine.
II. NFIB’S TRUE TARGET: THE COMMERCE POWER
The Chief Justice rejected the individual mandate under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, reasoning that “[e]ven if [it] is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s insurance reforms, [it]
is not a ‘proper’ means for making those reforms effective.”118 Why? Because the
mandate was neither “narrow in scope” nor “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the com-
merce power.”119 If upheld, the mandate
114 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130–31 (citations omitted).
115 For an argument that Comstock is a broad holding, even under Chief Justice Roberts’s
reading of the case in NFIB, see Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 114–15.
116 See Comstock, 560 U.S. at 163–65, 167–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 158.
118 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
119 Id. (quoting Comstock, 560 U.S. at 148, and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819)). Relying on McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411, 418, the Chief
Justice distinguished between “incidental” power on the one hand and “great substantive and
independent power” on the other. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93. For a
scholarly debate about such a distinction, compare Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad
News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual
Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267, 270 (2011) (arguing that the “Necessary and Proper
Clause . . . embodies the venerable doctrine of principals and incidents: a law enacted under
the Clause must exercise a subsidiary rather than an independent power”), and id. at 271
(arguing that “the power to order someone to purchase a product is not a power subordinate
or inferior to other powers. It is a power at least as significant . . . as the power to regulate
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would work a substantial expansion of federal authority. No
longer would Congress be limited to regulating under the Com-
merce Clause those who by some preexisting activity bring them-
selves within the sphere of federal regulation. Instead, Congress
could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw
within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be out-
side of it.120
In the end, the Chief Justice concluded: “Just as the individual mandate cannot be
sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of the failure to purchase health
insurance, neither can it be upheld as a ‘necessary and proper’ component of the
insurance reforms. The commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate.”121
Translation: the necessary and proper power reaches as far as the enumerated power
it enforces, and no farther. In this case, because Congress could not reach inactivity
under its commerce power, it could not reach it under the necessary and proper power,
as doing so would expand the commerce power beyond constitutional limits.122
Although such a restrictive reading of “proper” has been endorsed by a few com-
mentators,123 it contradicts long-established precedent that consistently reaffirmed
insurance pricing and rating practices” (citation omitted)), with Andrew Koppelman, Bad
News for Everybody: Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and Originalism, 121 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 515, 518–20 (2012) (arguing against adopting interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause proposed by Professors Lawson and Kopel), and id. at 522 (“The rules
that Lawson and Kopel’s originalist research claims to have uncovered, if implemented,
would seem to accomplish just what I have said that other arguments against the mandate would
do: ‘randomly blow up large parts of the U.S. Code.’” (citations omitted)). For further dis-
cussion, see also Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 161 (arguing that the distinc-
tion between independent and incidental powers “could have significant impact in the future,”
but also recognizing that Chief Justice Roberts fails to explain how to differentiate the two).
120 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 2593 (emphasis added).
122 Professors Pushaw and Nelson would seem to agree with this translation, as they “ap-
plaud [NFIB’s necessary and proper ruling] because we have long urged the Court, consistent
with the Constitution’s original meaning, to prevent Congress from relying upon the Necessary
and Proper Clause as a bootstrap to aggrandize power it does not possess under the Commerce
Clause.” Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 994 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123 See, e.g., supra note 122; Lawson & Granger, supra note 21, at 330 (“An executory
law that regulates subjects outside Congress’s enumerated powers is not ‘proper’ and there-
fore not constitutional. The Tenth Amendment, as with the rest of the Bill of Rights, is thus
declaratory of principles already contained in the unamended Constitution via the Sweeping
Clause.”); see also id. at 331 (“[E]xecutory laws may not regulate or prohibit activities that
fall outside the subject areas specifically enumerated in the Constitution.”); id. at 274 n.21
(“[T]he requirement that executory laws be ‘proper’ prevents the national government from
using the Sweeping Clause to regulate indirectly subjects over which it does not have direct
jurisdiction.”); id. at 331 (“To carry a law or power into execution . . . does not mean to
regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers more efficient.”
(citation omitted)).
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Congress’s power to regulate activities outside the reach of an enumerated power
when necessary to “carry[ ] into Execution”124 that enumerated power.125 Indeed, that
is the whole point of the Necessary and Proper Clause. If Congress had authority
under an enumerated power, it would not need to reach for the necessary and proper
power.126 As the Court recognized in Comstock, even though the Constitution does
not “speak[ ] explicitly” about the general power “to criminalize conduct, . . . to im-
prison individuals who engage in that conduct, . . . [or] to enact laws governing
prisons and prisoners,” such powers exist under “authority granted by the Necessary
and Proper Clause.”127 And in Raich, Justice Scalia clearly explained that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its
enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.”128 If the Chief
Justice’s statements in NFIB are to be taken at face value, then Comstock and Raich
are both wrong. Indeed, the list of decisions undermined by this reading of NFIB is
quite long.129
So the big question is whether this translation is correct. Was the Court (in par-
ticular, the Chief Justice) serious about steering the Necessary and Proper Clause in
a new and much narrower direction?130 Yes, the Court invalidated the individual
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
125 Professor Mashaw argues that the opinion “invite[s] [lower courts] . . . to take an
approach to the necessary and proper clause that has never been law at all.” Mashaw, supra
note 2, at 264. Congress has long been able to regulate something indirectly under the neces-
sary and proper power, even though it could not regulate it directly under an enumerated power
such as the commerce power. See id. at 260 (explaining that the regulated activity “need [not]
be commerce at all if its regulation is necessary and proper to a broader scheme of interstate
commerce regulation” (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971))).
126 Robert N. Weiner, a former Associate Deputy Attorney General for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, had the same reaction to the Chief Justice’s necessary and proper language:
“But if a particular piece of legislation were already within the scope of Congress’s enumerated
power, there would be no need to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Weiner, Much
Ado, supra note 17, at xiv, 77. Like this Article, see infra notes 133–49 and accompanying
text, he declines to read the Chief Justice’s language literally, concluding that “what the Chief
Justice appears to be saying is that, whether necessary or not, this particular provision simply
strays uncomfortably far beyond the commerce power.” Id. at 77.
127 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135–37 (2010).
128 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
129 Cf. Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 995 (“doubt[ing] that such revolutionary
changes will occur,” partly because “it is too late for the Court to overturn its cases rubber-
stamping all New Deal and Great Society legislation—or even its decisions in the 1970s and
1980s approving comprehensive environmental and criminal laws” (citation omitted));
Lawson & Granger, supra note 21, at 331–32 (arguing that the law upheld in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), “is plainly not ‘proper for carrying into Execution’ the federal
commerce power”).
130 Professor Somin discusses a “less restrictive” reading of “proper,” which would “only
bar[ ] statutes whose rationale leads to unlimited congressional power or renders large parts
of the rest of Article I redundant.” Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 159. Al-
though he argues that the mandate fails under this “less restrictive” reading, he posits that Chief
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mandate under the Necessary and Proper Clause.131 And yes, Chief Justice Roberts
used sweeping language to explain his reasoning.132 But as explained below, although
the Chief Justice is concerned about the reach of the necessary and proper power,
a close reading of his opinion suggests that his primary concern involves congressio-
nal use of the commerce power as “a general license to regulate an individual from
cradle to grave . . . .”133 Thus, the language in his opinion should not be interpreted
as a signal of significant change in necessary and proper doctrine across the board.134
A. Reading Between the Lines
A sure signal that commerce, rather than the necessary and proper power, was the
true target in the Chief Justice’s opinion appeared in its means analysis. A traditional
necessary and proper analysis involves an evaluation of whether the mandate was
necessary to enforcing the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions in the
ACA135—provisions that are themselves proper exercises of the commerce power.136
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice’s opinion makes no attempt to evaluate the relationship
Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB might have embraced a “broader reading of propriety,”
one that “would bar any new claims of authority that are major independent powers as opposed
to mere ‘incidents’ of one of the other enumerated powers.” Id. (citation omitted). However,
this Article argues that Chief Justice Roberts is concerned primarily about preventing a general
federal police power, which seems more in line with Professor Somin’s “less restrictive”
reading of the term “proper.” See infra notes 133, 169–73 and accompanying text.
131 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (“[T]he individual
mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”).
132 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
133 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591; see Weiner, Much Ado, supra note 17,
at 77–78 (reaching same conclusion).
134 But cf. Lawson, supra note 7, at 1706 (praising Chief Justice Roberts’s necessary and
proper analysis because “[t]he short-term consequence of [his] opinion is to bring to the
forefront the agency-law origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the importance of
determining, as a threshold matter, whether any claimed exercise of congressional authority
under that Clause seeks to exercise a principal rather than incidental power”); id. at 1700–07
(explaining basis for praise).
135 The guaranteed-issue provision prohibited “insurers from denying coverage to any
person on account of that person’s medical condition or history,” and the community-rating
provision prohibited “insurance companies from charging higher premiums to those with pre-
existing conditions.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a)
(2006 ed., Supp. IV)).
136 As Justice Ginsburg explained: “Recall that one of Congress’ goals in enacting the
Affordable Care Act was to eliminate the insurance industry’s practice of charging higher
prices or denying coverage to individuals with preexisting medical conditions . . . . The com-
merce power allows Congress to ban this practice, a point no one disputes.” Id. at 2626
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (“We do not doubt that the
buying and selling of health insurance contracts is commerce generally subject to federal
regulation.”).
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between the mandate and these other insurance reforms. Although Chief Justice
Roberts invokes Comstock, Jinks, and Sabri, explaining that those cases “involved
exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power,”137 he fails to
perform a similar examination of the mandate.138 Rather than assessing the individ-
ual mandate as it relates to the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions,
he considers the mandate in complete isolation, concluding that the mandate is
unconstitutional because it “vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the
necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”139
But that is not a necessary and proper analysis; it is a commerce analysis. A “nec-
essary predicate” to the exercise of the necessary and proper power is a separate
exercise of an enumerated power, which in this case would be the guaranteed-issue
and community-rating provisions.140 The mandate did not “create” those provisions;
they were separate provisions within the ACA. And the Court’s job was to assess its
137 Id. at 2573.
138 Justice Ginsburg noted a related problem with the Chief Justice’s necessary and proper
analysis—his failure “to explain why the power to direct either the purchase of health in-
surance or, alternatively, the payment of a penalty collectible as a tax is more far-reaching
than other implied powers this Court has found meet under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”
Id. at 2627 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139 Id. at 2592. Professor Koppelman noticed a similar defect in reasoning by a federal
district judge who ruled the mandate unconstitutional. Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers,
supra note 30, at 8 (criticizing the lower court’s conclusion that mandate was unconsti-
tutional under the necessary and proper power because the end was “not within Congress’s
enumerated powers,” even though the court had previously concluded that “‘regulating the
health care insurance industry’ is a legitimate end” (quoting Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2011) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011))).
The joint dissent examined the relationship between the mandate and the guaranteed-
issue and community-rating provisions, concluding that the former is unnecessary to the latter.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2645–46. Other parts of its necessary and proper
analysis, however, suggest a primary concern with the commerce power. See infra notes 150–51
and accompanying text.
140 Professor Koppelman reads the “necessary predicate” language differently, arguing
that the Chief Justice meant that “Congress cannot arrogate to itself the power to solve prob-
lems that are of its own making.” Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 114 (citation
omitted). I agree that if this is what the Chief Justice meant, it would be inconsistent with prece-
dent. Id. at 114–15. But I don’t think that is what he meant. The Chief Justice complained that
the “mandate . . . create[d] the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (emphasis added). The mandate, of course, did
not create the problems that triggered the need for an exercise of the necessary and proper
power; other provisions in the ACA created such problems and the mandate was Congress’s
proposed solution. Id. at 2613–14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining how guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions created problems solvable
by individual mandate). The mandate did, however, create the “necessary predicate” to an
exercise of the commerce power—activity. Id. at 2592. Thus, I think the language is better
interpreted as nothing more than a reprise of the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause argument.
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relationship to the mandate. The “necessary predicate” to an exercise of the enumer-
ated commerce power is activity. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his earlier
commerce analysis: “The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of
commercial activity to be regulated. If the power to ‘regulate’ something included the
power to create it, many of the provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous.”141
So to the extent the mandate created activity, it created the “necessary predicate” to
the exercise of the commerce power.142 That doomed the exercise of the commerce
power, but it should not have doomed the exercise of the necessary and proper power,
at least under the necessity prong.
We again see the conflation of the two powers at the end of the necessary and
proper discussion where the Chief Justice stated that “[t]he commerce power thus
does not authorize the mandate.”143 Just as the means analysis is really a commerce
analysis, this conclusion is really a commerce conclusion. If the Commerce Clause does
not authorize the mandate, it is because either the mandate, as a combined exercise
of the necessary and proper and commerce powers, seeks to execute an end not within
the enumerated commerce power or the mandate is improper under the commerce
power standing alone (which the Chief Justice had already concluded).144 But as ex-
plained above, the mandate sought to execute other provisions of the ACA concededly
within the commerce power.145 So if the commerce power does not authorize the
mandate, it has to be because the mandate is improper under commerce alone. This
answers the commerce question, but not the necessary and proper question.
Finally, embedded within both the Chief Justice’s and the joint dissent’s neces-
sary and proper discussion is a focus on the growing commerce power. Although
Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern that the mandate “would work a substantial
expansion of federal authority,” he also expressed particular concern that if the mandate
were upheld,
[n]o longer would Congress be limited to regulating under the
Commerce Clause those who by some preexisting activity bring
themselves within the sphere of federal regulation. Instead,
Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority
and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would
be outside of it.146
141 Id. at 2586 (second emphasis added).
142 The joint dissent makes a similar point about the mandate: “We do not doubt that the
buying and selling of health insurance contracts is commerce generally subject to federal
regulation. But when Congress provides that (nearly) all citizens must buy an insurance con-
tract, it goes beyond ‘adjust[ing] by rule or method’ . . . it directs the creation of commerce.”
Id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
143 Id. at 2593 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
144 See id. (stating that the “commerce power . . . does not authorize the mandate”).
145 See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.
146 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (emphasis added).
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The concern about whether the mandate regulates something outside of commerce,
however, seems more appropriate in a commerce analysis than a necessary and proper
analysis. Indeed—it is the exact concern the Chief Justice expressed in his commerce
power discussion.147 Congress reaches for the necessary and proper power precisely
because it cannot use the enumerated power alone.148 Combining the necessary and
proper power with an enumerated power will technically increase the reach of the enu-
merated power.149 But if that is the primary concern, then every use of the necessary
and proper power is unconstitutional.
For its part, the joint dissent expressed concern that “[i]f Congress can reach out
and command even those furthest removed from an interstate market to participate in
the market, then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power . . . .”150
Rejecting a comparison to Raich, it also argued that “mandating . . . economic ac-
tivity [stretches federal power into] a field so limitless that it converts the Commerce
Clause into a general authority to direct the economy . . . .”151 But the natural focus
in a necessary and proper analysis ought to be, as Chief Justice Roberts initially noted
in the quoted material above,152 whether the Necessary and Proper Clause, as used
in the particular manner under scrutiny, unduly expands federal reach in general.153
Interestingly, when discussing how exercises of the necessary and proper power might
lead to federalism violations, Sabri, Jinks, Raich, and Comstock all used language
that focused more generally on whether Congress’s selected means undermines the
general federal structure, rather than what will happen to the particular enumerated
power.154 The joint dissent is not wrong, of course, to focus on what happens to the
147 Id. at 2590 (“But we have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in
order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce.”).
148 See Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers, supra note 30, at 8 (criticizing a district
court’s conclusion that if Congress may not reach something with the commerce power, it
likewise may not reach it with necessary and proper power); cf. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 260
(noting that “an action need not be . . . commerce at all if its regulation is necessary and
proper to a broader scheme of interstate commerce regulation” (citation omitted)).
149 Justice O’Connor recognized this concept in her description of Congress’s commerce
and spending powers in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992): “The Court’s broad
construction of Congress’ power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses has of course
been guided, as it has with respect to Congress’ power generally, by the Constitution’s Nec-
essary and Proper Clause . . . .” Id. at 158.
150 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (emphasis added).
151 Id. (emphasis added).
152 Id. at 2592; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
153 See Somin, The Individual Mandate, supra note 3, at 159 (applying a “minimalistic
definition of propriety that only bars statutes whose rationale leads to unlimited congres-
sional power or renders large parts of the rest of Article I redundant,” but acknowledging that
a more stringent definition is possible).
154 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 148 (2010) (concluding that a civil commit-
ment statute did not “confer[ ] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States’” (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 618 (2000))); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38–40 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)
2015] THE (NOT SO DIRE) FUTURE AFTER NFIB V. SEBELIUS 393
commerce power when assessing whether Congress has properly used its necessary
and proper power. A too drastic increase in the commerce power when accompanied
by the necessary and proper power could very well create a federalism violation, and
that clearly is the concern. The point is that the linguistic shift of focus, particularly
when compared to earlier necessary and proper decisions, provides a further signal
that the Court’s mission is a commerce-based one.
B. Back to Business as Usual
If the NFIB Court were indeed serious about cutting back on the scope of the
necessary and proper power across the board, one would expect to see evidence of
this in the two post-NFIB necessary and proper decisions. Although both cases—United
States v. Kebodeaux155 and Bond v. United States156—provided real opportunities to
continue applying rigorous limits on the power, a majority of the Court, including
several Justices who voted against the mandate in NFIB, did not pursue them.
Just one year after its decision in NFIB, seven members of the Court upheld a
broad exercise of the necessary and proper power with no mention whatsoever of
NFIB. Kebodeaux involved application of the sex offender registration requirements
contained in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)157 to a
military sex offender who had completed his federal sentence and had been dis-
charged from the armed forces.158 The Court upheld SORNA’s application in these
circumstances, explaining first that the pre-existing federal registration require-
ments, to which Kebodeaux was subject when SORNA was enacted, were constitu-
tional as a necessary and proper means of executing Congress’s power to “make
Rules for the . . . Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”159 Congress may use the
Military Regulation Clause to prohibit certain conduct by those in the armed forces,
and then invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce those prohibitions with
punishments, including criminalizing the conduct, incarcerating the violator, and
“impos[ing] restrictions on [him] even years after . . . unconditional release . . . .”160
(exercise of necessary and proper power held unconstitutional when it “threatens to obliterate
the line between ‘what is truly national and what is truly local’” or “[w]hen [it] violates [a
constitutional] principle of state sovereignty”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567–68 (1995), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997)); Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (federal bribery law did not create “general police power”
because it was “bound up with congressional authority to spend in the first place”); Jinks v.
Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 464 (2003) (concluding that “the connection between [the
means] and Congress’s authority over the federal courts” is not “so attenuated as to under-
mine the enumeration of powers set forth in Article I, § 8” (citation omitted)).
155 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
156 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
157 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2012).
158 Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2499–500.
159 Id. at 2502 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
160 Id. at 2507 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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Second, the Court explained that SORNA’s provisions, as amendments to the pre-
existing requirements, likewise were necessary and proper means of enforcing the
prohibitions executed under the Military Regulation Clause and, thus, could be ap-
plied to “an individual already subject to federal registration requirements . . . .”161
Kebodeaux is a significant decision for several reasons, not the least of which
is the breadth of Congress’s reach—legislation designed to enforce military conduct
regulations can be applied to an individual no longer associated with the military.
Equally significant (and related to the first point) is that the Court allowed Congress
to employ its necessary and proper power to regulate that which it could not regulate
using an enumerated power alone.162 Although the Military Regulation Clause does
not allow Congress to regulate someone no longer associated with the armed forces,163
the Necessary and Proper Clause, in conjunction with Military Regulation Clause,
does allow Congress to do so.164 Also important is the language used by the majority,
which echoes that of Comstock and other pre-NFIB cases. The Court described the nec-
essary and proper power as “broad” and admitted that the power “leav[es] to Congress
a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power.”165
The Court’s analysis focused on the necessity prong—the reasonableness of the regis-
tration requirement as a means of enforcing military conduct regulations166—with little
discussion about the scope of the Military Regulation Clause167 and no discernable
discussion about whether the registration requirement would unconstitutionally in-
crease that power.
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment because he agreed that
Congress can give th[e] [military conduct] rules force by imposing
consequences on members of the military who disobey them. . . .
A servicemember will be less likely to violate a relevant military
regulation if he knows that, having done so, he will be required
to register as a sex offender years into the future.168
He wrote separately, not to discuss the dangers of the necessary and proper power
increasing Congress’s power to regulate the armed forces, but rather to remind us
that the necessary and proper power does not authorize a federal police power.169
161 Id. at 2504.
162 Id. at 2502–03.
163 Id. at 2512–13 (Thomas, J., dissenting)  (“Congress does not retain a general police power
over every person who has ever served in the military.” (citing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955))).
164 Id. at 2503.
165 Id. at 2502–03 (citation omitted).
166 Id. at 2503–05.
167 See id. at 2503.
168 Id. at 2506 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
169 Id. at 2507.
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Language in the majority opinion discussing the general public safety benefits flow-
ing from SORNA’s registration requirements, he explained, could cause “incautious
readers [to] think they have found in the majority opinion something they would not
find in either the Constitution or any prior decision of ours: a federal police power.”170
The “[power to] ‘help protect the public . . . and alleviate public safety concerns’”171
would transform the nature of federal authority into such a power and, thus, “is not
‘consist[ent] with the letter and spirt of the constitution.’”172
The Chief Justice’s focus on the creation of a federal police power as the line of
demarcation between constitutional and unconstitutional exercises of the necessary
and proper power nicely tracks the pre-NFIB cases,173 suggesting that he is interested
in minding the outer boundaries of the necessary and proper power, rather than dramati-
cally restricting it. Curiously, although Chief Justice Roberts’s reminder about the
limits of federal power is both important and correct, no one joined his concurrence,
not even Justice Kennedy, who joined the majority opinion without comment despite
previously having raised concerns about a creeping necessary and proper power.174
The remaining concurring and dissenting opinions reveal no serious threat to the
necessary and proper power. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, writing separ-
ately to explain why he believed the registration requirement was necessary to enforc-
ing the Military Regulation Clause.175 Interestingly, his position arguably is not all that
narrow, allowing the registration requirement because it “tr[ied] to eliminate or at least
diminish [a] danger” created by Congress’s use of military tribunals.176 Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissented, arguing that the registration requirements are not designed
to execute an enumerated power, but are “instead aimed at protecting society from
sex offenders and violent child predators,” a power not vested in Congress.177 Only
Justice Thomas articulated a very narrow vision of the power, repeating his position
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 2506 (quoting id. at 2503 (majority opinion)).
172 Id. at 2507 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
173 See supra note 154.
174 See supra note 112.
175 Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2508 (Alito, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 2509 (“When Congress, in validly exercising a power expressly conferred by the
Constitution, creates or exacerbates a dangerous situation (here, the possibility that a con-
victed sex offender may escape registration), Congress has the power to try to eliminate or
at least diminish that danger.” (citations omitted)). Professor Koppelman reads the Chief
Justice’s opinion in NFIB to deny that power to Congress, and then explains why the Chief
Justice’s position is wrong. Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 114 (arguing
that Congress has power to address the negative consequences flowing from a “statutory
scheme” and disagreeing with Chief Justice Roberts on that point).
177 Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2513 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); id. at
2509–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not “establish . . . that the [pre-
existing] registration requirement was itself a valid exercise of any federal power, or that
SORNA is designed to carry the [pre-existing registration requirement] into execution”).
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in Comstock that “[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide Congress
with authority to enact any law simply because it furthers other laws Congress has
enacted in the exercise of its incidental authority . . . .”178 With no one joining him
on that point (again), it provides no real evidence of a likelihood of significant future
restriction.
Two years after NFIB, the Court again missed an opportunity to cut back on the
necessary and proper power. Bond v. United States involved a challenge to the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998,179 which was enacted
to implement a treaty.180 The centerpiece of the challenge was whether the necessary
and proper power authorized Congress to criminalize local conduct181 as a means of
“executing the National Government’s power to make treaties,”182 even though
Congress lacked authority to regulate such local conduct in the absence of the
treaty.183 The court of appeals ruled that Missouri v. Holland,184 decided more than
ninety years earlier, answered the question affirmatively,185 and petitioner urged the
Court to “limit[ ] or overrule[ ]” that decision.186 Thus, Bond provided a big target
for any Justice interested in limiting the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion and declined to take aim. Avoid-
ing the constitutional issue, he resolved the dispute by ruling that the statute did not
reach petitioner’s conduct.187
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) did take
aim, characterizing Holland as “ipse dixit” and arguing that the necessary and proper
power can only be used to make treaties, not implement them.188 But they stood
178 Id. at 2515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126,
168 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia declined to join this portion of Justice
Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 2509 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179 18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998).
180 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2080–81 (2014); see also Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).
181 The local conduct in Bond involved “an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her
husband’s lover, which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing
with water.” Id. at 2083.
182 Id. at 2087.
183 See id. (“[T]he parties have devoted significant effort to arguing whether [the statutory
provision], as applied to Bond’s offense, is a necessary and proper means of executing the
National Government’s power to make treaties.” (citation omitted)).
184 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
185 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086.
186 Id. at 2087.
187 Id. (“[I]t is ‘a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court’s
jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some
other ground upon which to dispose of the case.’” (quoting Escambia Cty. v. McMillan, 466
U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam))).
188 Id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring). As Justice Scalia explained:
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alone with that argument. Justice Alito joined the part of Justice Scalia’s concurrence
explaining why the statute applied to the local conduct at issue, but he declined to join
the part articulating the narrow vision of the necessary and proper power.189
In the end, Bond represented an opportunity to cut back on the necessary and
proper power by overruling Holland, an opportunity that should have been tempting
for federalism-minded Justices, particularly because it involved federal regulation
of local criminal conduct—conduct traditionally reserved to the states. Their failure
to take advantage of it suggests that a majority of the Court is not bent on drastically
scaling back the power.
C. The Future Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause
Examined in isolation, the NFIB decision can be interpreted to call for a dramatic
narrowing of the necessary and proper power. Indeed, the Chief Justice’s opinion,
in particular, seemingly disables Congress from reaching anything with its necessary
and proper power that it could not reach with an enumerated power alone. Consid-
ered in a broader context, however, a much different picture emerges. Although the
power will not be free and clear of federalism restrictions, it seems likely that NFIB
was not the beginning of significant tightening of both prongs of the necessary and
proper power.
The pre-NFIB federalism rumblings were louder from some Justices than others,
but the common theme of most of these rumblings was concern about congressional
use of the necessary and proper power to create a general federal police power, not
a desire to restrict the power’s traditional reach.190 NFIB definitely increased the
federalism volume, but the real vehemence seems aimed at Congress’s use of its com-
merce power and, hence, its use of the necessary and proper power in conjunction
Read together, the two Clauses empower Congress to pass laws “nec-
essary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] Power . . . to
make treaties.”
It is obvious what the Clauses, read together, do not say. They do not
authorize Congress to enact laws for carrying into execution “Treaties,”
even treaties that do not execute themselves . . . .
Id.; see also id. at 2098–102 (explaining reasoning). Justice Thomas also wrote “separately
to suggest that the Treaty Power is itself a limited federal power.” Id. 2103 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted). He was joined by Justice Scalia in full and Justice Alito in
part. Id. at 2102.
189 See id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Alito joins only Part I of
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which discusses the statutory interpretation question, not the
necessary and proper question). Justice Alito ultimately concluded that the treaty, to the
extent “[it] may be read to obligate the United States to . . . criminaliz[e]” local conduct,
“exceeds the scope of the treaty power.” Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
As a result, the statutory provision at issue “cannot be regarded as necessary and proper to
carry into execution the treaty power . . . .” Id.
190 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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with the commerce power. Post-NFIB, the Court upholds a broad combined exercise
of necessary and proper and military regulation powers with a loose necessary
analysis, and fails to even take a swipe at the power when used in conjunction with
the treaty power.191
From this emerges a conclusion and a few predictions: The Court as a whole is
not interested in seriously cutting back both prongs of the necessary and proper power,
though a majority of Justices remain committed to the mission begun in Lopez—con-
trolling the size of federal power, particularly the commerce power.192 The Court
will be on the lookout for overreaching, but generally at the outer boundaries193 of
the power—i.e., exercises of the necessary and proper power so large as to disrupt
the federal balance.194 Moreover, exercises of the commerce power seem to garner
closer attention, which means exercises of the necessary and proper power as a means
of executing the commerce power probably will also garner such attention.
Accordingly, it should be business as usual with most exercises of the necessary
and proper power that seek to enforce any enumerated end other than commerce.
Kebodeaux is a good example of this, as seven Justices upheld a broad exercise of
the power to execute the Military Regulation Clause without mentioning NFIB.195
191 See supra notes 162–89.
192 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion in NFIB with a reminder that the
scope of federal power vis-à-vis the states “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue
to arise, as long as our system shall exist,” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2577 (2012) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)),
strongly suggesting that the Court will continue to be on the lookout for federal overreaching.
193 The joint dissent describes the Court’s modern approach in this manner, stating that
“[a]t the outer edge of the commerce power, this Court has insisted on careful scrutiny of
regulations that do not act directly on an interstate market or its participants.” Id. at 2646
(joint dissent) (describing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)); cf. Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 979 (describing
Lopez as an “attempt to enforce an outer boundary on Congress’s power . . . .”). Professor
Theodore W. Ruger describes the Court’s approach as “frontier federalism,” explaining that
“[f]or almost two decades . . . many of the justices on both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have chosen to mend fences at the far boundaries of federal power, seeking to delimit the thin
sliver of authority that remains ‘truly local’ and thus completely beyond federal attention.”
Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable
Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICA-
TIONS 359, 359–60 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013).
194 Justice Kennedy perhaps said it best in his concurrence in Lopez:
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to re-
spect the constitutional design, . . . the federal balance is too essential
a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing
freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
195 See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
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As long as Congress’s selected means reasonably help achieve an enumerated power,
the Court is very likely to review the exercise with deference.196
It is now clear, however, that a majority of the current Court views the term
“proper” as a judicially enforceable internal limit on the necessary and proper power,
and these federalism-minded Justices will not hesitate to invoke that limit with any
exercise of the power that looks like it would transform the Necessary and Proper
Clause into a general police power. If the law is aimed at effectuating an enumerated
power, but appears to “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government,”197 the Court is going to in-
validate the law after taking a good, hard look at it.198 Similarly, if the Court finds that
Congress’s actual goal is unenumerated (such as the desire to increase public safety)
or that Congress has invoked an enumerated power as a “pretext”199 for achieving
something unenumerated (again, public safety), the Court will invalidate it. Congress
side-stepped these problems in Kebodeaux, because its actual goal was execution of
its power to regulate the armed forces and the means were reasonably related to that
end.200 Nothing Congress said or did triggered Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence; he
wrote separately because some language in the majority opinion could be interpreted
as authorizing a federal police power.201 Because he agreed that the sex offender
196 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015), supports this
prediction, as he embraces a deferential approach to the necessary prong in a case involving
execution of Congress’s power over naturalization. See id. at 2117 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that “when faced with alternative ways to carry its powers into execution, Congress has
the ‘discretion’ to choose the one it deems ‘most beneficial to the people’” (citation omitted)).
In that same case, Justice Thomas (alone) maintained his very narrow view of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, requiring the means to “be ‘directly link[ed]’ to the enumerated power.”
Id. at 2105 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 169 n.8 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); see id. at 2126 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Justice Thomas’s “parsimonious interpretation of Congress’s authority
to enact laws ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ the President’s executive
powers” (citation omitted)). The majority did not discuss the necessary and proper power as
a basis for upholding the federal law, as it ruled that the Executive has exclusive authority
over recognition of foreign nations. See id. at 2083–94.
197 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
198 See Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 3, at 1349 (explaining that the “rationales
offered by the government and by many law professors [in NFIB] fell on five deaf ears”
because “these rationales, if accepted, would lead to a national police power qualified only
by the Bill of Rights . . . .”); id. (describing “New Federalism” as prohibiting “[a]ny pur-
ported justification that would lead to an unlimited reading of Congress’s Article I, Section 8
powers . . . .”); cf. id. at 1333 (arguing that “[h]ad we not contested this power grab [i.e., the
individual mandate], Congress’s regulatory powers would have been rendered limitless”).
199 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
200 See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2503–04.
201 Id. at 2506–07.
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registration requirements served to enforce military conduct regulations, he voted
to uphold the law.202
It is tempting to predict that exercises of the necessary and proper power to
execute the commerce power will receive less scrutiny if they represent traditional
combinations of the two powers. For example, Comstock recognized that “Congress
routinely exercises its authority to enact criminal laws in furtherance of” several
enumerated powers, including the commerce power.203 Such laws are not only familiar
but also ubiquitous.204 Indeed, the law in Raich, which criminalized local activity in
order to effectuate a larger regulation of commercial activity, escaped close scrutiny
on the necessity prong, even by Justice Kennedy, who joined the majority.205 But
that might not be the case any longer (unless of course the Court loses its federalism
majority) because five years later in Comstock, Justice Kennedy called for a tighter
means/ends analysis, “at least as exacting as it has been in the Commerce Clause
cases, if not more so.”206 And in NFIB, the joint dissent made clear that it reads Raich
as involving a tight means/ends analysis, explaining that “the growing and posses-
sion prohibitions were the only practicable way of enabling the prohibition of inter-
state traffic in marijuana.”207 Given the demonstrated interest in controlling the creep
of the commerce power, it is possible that the five Justices who voted against the
commerce and necessary and proper powers in NFIB will heed the call and more
rigorously apply the necessity prong in instances when Congress seeks to execute
the commerce power.
This is not to say that they will do so in every case, however, or that such review
will always be fatal. The more familiar the exercise, the less likely it will be closely
scrutinized and/or invalidated. As others have pointed out, a majority of the Court
is probably disinclined to invalidate decades-old precedent.208 That said, there are
202 Id. at 2505–06.
203 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 136 (2010).
204 See id. at 147–48 (“Neither we nor the dissent can point to a single specific enumerated
power ‘that justifies a criminal defendant’s arrest or conviction[ ]’ . . . in all cases because
Congress relies on different enumerated powers (often, but not exclusively, its Commerce
Clause power) to enact its various federal criminal statutes.” (second emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted)).
205 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3, 17 (2005).
206 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647 (2012) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). This tight means/ends analysis is inconsistent with the traditional deference
accorded Congress. Koppelman, Necessary, Proper, supra note 2, at 115 (noting that the
“joint dissenters seem to think that McCulloch adopted the rule that the decision specifically
rejected . . . .”); Weiner, Much Ado, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that the joint dissent’s
“approach would have overruled McCulloch v. Maryland, which for 193 years has stood for
the proposition that the clause did not impose a standard of necessity” (citations omitted)).
208 See Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 995 (expressing “doubt that such revolutionary
changes will occur,” in part because of “the Court’s near-perfect track record over seventy-five
years of upholding Acts of Congress passed pursuant [to] Article I, typically the Commerce
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two types of cases that likely will trigger closer scrutiny by the current federalism
majority: (1) any combination of the two powers that looks unfamiliar;209 and (2) any
regulation of local non-economic activity that is alleged to substantially affect com-
merce or to be an essential component of a larger economic regulation. NFIB repre-
sents the first type of case, as it involved an unusual law—regulation of inactivity.210
The second type represents cases falling under “category three” of the traditional
commerce power test. Although such cases have been framed as commerce power
cases,211 Justice Scalia has explained that they are more appropriately viewed as a
combination of the necessary and proper and commerce powers.212 The joint dissent
and Necessary and Proper Clauses,” and in part because “it is too late for the Court to over-
turn its cases rubber-stamping all New Deal and Great Society legislation—or even its decisions
in the 1970s and 1980s approving comprehensive environmental and criminal laws” (citations
omitted)); id. at 979 (asserting that “the Court would risk legal, political, social, and economic
chaos by rolling back its precedent allowing such important federal laws,” and that “at most
the conservative Justices can try to stem the tide of new Commerce Clause statutes” (citation
omitted)); cf. Jackson, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing against “[j]ettisoning the [substantial
effects] test [because it] would undermine a significant amount of national regulation” and
“the events of 2008 and after demonstrate the need for a flexible constitutional approach to
the national economy and the substantial effects test provides that flexibility”).
209 Invoking “an alternate interpretation of the New Deal Settlement,” Professor Barnett
argues that all assertions of unfamiliar federal power will receive tighter scrutiny. Barnett,
No Small Feat, supra note 3, at 1348. As he explained:
[F]or better or worse, all of the powers that were approved by the New
Deal and Warren Courts are now to be taken as constitutional. But any
claim of additional new powers still needs justification. Put another
way, the expansion of congressional power authorized by the New Deal
and Warren Courts established a new high-water mark of constitutional
power. Going any higher than this, however, requires special justification.
Id.
210 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (noting that “Congress has
never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to
purchase an unwanted product,” and that “sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a]
severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ . . . .” (alterations in
original) (citation omitted)); Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 3, at 1333 (noting that the
individual mandate “was literally and legally unprecedented” (citation omitted)); Pushaw &
Nelson, supra note 2, at 995 (noting that “the ACA is the only Commerce Clause statute in
over two centuries that purported to regulate ‘inactivity’ by mandating the purchase of a
product” (citation omitted)); Weiner, Much Ado, supra note 17, at 75 (noting that both the
Chief Justice and the joint dissenters “emphasized the novelty of the individual mandate”).
211 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–38
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Lopez
and noting that power to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect commerce “de-
rives from the conjunction of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause”
(citations omitted)); Jackson, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that “the Necessary and Proper Clause
has been interpreted as allowing Congress to regulate those activities that substantially affect
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in NFIB made clear that the Court carefully examined regulations “[a]t the outer edge
of the commerce power,”213 citing Lopez and Morrison as examples,214 both of which
are “category three” cases involving regulation of local non-economic activity.215
And the joint dissent viewed Lopez and Morrison (as well as others) as teaching that
“the Necessary and Proper Clause[ ] is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help
achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”216 Thus, the Court
seems poised to use the necessary and proper power, rather than commerce alone, as
the vehicle for closely examining federal regulation of local non-economic activity.217
Doing so will change our understanding of the scope of the necessary and proper
power, as its reach will shrink. But it will not change our current understanding of
federal power in general, for even before NFIB such regulations received the full
attention of federalism-minded Justices under the Commerce Clause.218
Commerce among the several states” (citations omitted)); Lawson, supra note 7, at 1708–09
(“Congress may well be able to regulate noninterstate-commerce activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce, but only under the Necessary and Proper Clause (and consistent
with all of the limitations on the scope of the power granted by that Clause), not under the
Commerce Clause itself.”); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 2, at 994–95 (recognizing that “the
‘substantial effects’ test rests heavily upon the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .” (citation
omitted)); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 5–7 (noting the relationship between necessary and proper
power and “substantial effects doctrine” used with commerce power); cf. Lawson, supra note
7, at 1703 (“While Lopez and Morrison did not expressly invoke this reading of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, the joint opinion [in NFIB] clarifies that such a reading was implicit
in and underlies those decisions.”).
Not everyone agrees with Justice Scalia on this point. In his Comstock concurrence,
Justice Kennedy describes Lopez and Raich as “Commerce Clause cases.” United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 152 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts
uses Lopez in his commerce discussion, suggesting he might view it as a commerce power
case as well. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587. For a detailed discussion of
“[t]he influence of the Necessary and Proper Clause on the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence,” see David Loudon, When Do the Ends Justify the Means?: The Role of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in the Commerce Clause Analysis, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 294,
305, 305–22 (2015); see id. at 299 (noting that “the Court has rarely addressed the relation-
ship between the two clauses . . . .”).
213 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
214 Id.
215 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19 (2000) (analyzing law under
substantial effects test); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560–68 (1995) (same).
216 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (first emphasis added).
217 For a critique of how the various opinions in NFIB treated the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as well as a proposed means/ends test for the Clause when used to execute the com-
merce power that “gives Congress the flexibility to choose the means of executing its powers
without giving it a national police power,” see Loudon, supra note 212, at 322–43.
218 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy characterized Lopez as a
commerce power case, supra note 212, and viewed it as applying a more rigorous analysis
than is usually associated with the rational basis test. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126,
152 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Those precedents require a tangible link to commerce,
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The bottom line is that NFIB did not signal radical change ahead with respect
to the necessary and proper power. The decision did signal, however, that five Justices
remain committed to enforcing federalism limits on federal power in general and the
commerce power in particular. Thus, the Court likely will continue to apply a defer-
ential necessary and proper analysis to laws seeking to enforce enumerated powers
other than the commerce power (unless the laws appear to transform the federal power
into a general police power), but likely will up the ante with laws seeking to enforce
the commerce power.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s invalidation of the individual mandate under the Necessary and
Proper Clause immediately grabbed my attention, for it suggested a new and dramatic
change in doctrine. Most significantly, language in the Chief Justice’s opinion sug-
gested that the necessary and proper power could no longer be used to reach anything
outside of an enumerated power, rendering a once huge power fairly tiny. So the
decision left me wondering: Did NFIB inflict a life-altering knock-out punch or just
a superficial cut?
Examined in isolation, one could argue that it was the former. Examined in a much
larger context, including the decisions leading up to and following NFIB, it appears
to be closer to the latter. Before NFIB, the Court warned about using the necessary
and proper power as a general police power, putting everyone on notice that the
Court would enforce federalism limits,219 at least at the margins. Although NFIB
suggests much stronger enforcement of federalism limits, a close reading reveals
continued frustration with congressional overreaching with the commerce power,220
and this frustration spills over into the necessary and proper analysis. In other words,
the commerce power was the true target of the Court’s ire, not the necessary and
proper power. NFIB was simply a continuation of the specific mission begun in
Lopez—to contain the reach of the commerce power. A decision handed down just
one year after NFIB reinforces this conclusion, as seven Justices upheld a broad ex-
ercise of the necessary and proper power in connection with the Military Regulation
Clause using a traditional deferential analysis with no mention of NFIB.221
not a mere conceivable rational relation . . . .”). Thus, even if “category three” cases are
treated under the commerce power alone, rather than a combination of the necessary and
proper and commerce powers, they will receive less deference.
219 Somin, Comstock, Bond, supra note 10 (“Comstock and especially [the Court’s first
decision in Bond addressing standing to raise federalism challenges] should have alerted ob-
servers to the likelihood that the individual mandate litigation would not be an easy win for
the federal government.”).
220 See Devins, supra note 2, at 1846 (“Indeed, against the backdrop of congressional in-
attention to the Constitution, including constitutional fact-finding, it is hard to find fault with
the five Justices who wanted to slap Congress (even if another form of boundary control might
have been preferable).” (citation omitted)).
221 See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
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So with time for reflection, the message from NFIB seems not so ominous. In fact,
it seems not much different from the message the Court has been sending since Lopez
was decided in 1995. A majority of Justices on the current Court are serious about
minding the federal balance, particularly when it comes to the commerce power, and
they will do so when necessary to prevent federal power from transforming into a
general police power. Thus, exercises of the necessary and proper power intended to
enforce the commerce power likely will trigger closer scrutiny. Significant narrow-
ing across the board, however, is unlikely. Unless they create or threaten to create a
general federal police power, exercises of the necessary and proper power to enforce
any enumerated power other than commerce should continue to receive the traditionally
deferential analysis. In other words, for the most part it should be business as usual.
